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Abstract Functional neuroimaging investigations of pain
have discovered a reliable pattern of activation within
limbic regions of a putative ‘‘pain matrix’’ that has been
theorized to reflect the affective dimension of pain. To test
this theory, we evaluated the experience of pain in a rare
neurological patient with extensive bilateral lesions
encompassing core limbic structures of the pain matrix,
including the insula, anterior cingulate, and amygdala.
Despite widespread damage to these regions, the patient’s
expression and experience of pain was intact, and at times
excessive in nature. This finding was consistent across
multiple pain measures including self-report, facial
expression, vocalization, withdrawal reaction, and auto-
nomic response. These results challenge the notion of a
‘‘pain matrix’’ and provide direct evidence that the insula,
anterior cingulate, and amygdala are not necessary for
feeling the suffering inherent to pain. The patient’s
heightened degree of pain affect further suggests that these
regions may be more important for the regulation of pain
rather than providing the decisive substrate for pain’s
conscious experience.
Keywords Brain lesion  Consciousness  Emotion 
Feeling  Limbic system
Introduction
This past decade has witnessed the emergence of a new
paradigm in neuroscience, where inferences about psy-
chological states are made based on certain overlapping
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patterns of brain activation found during functional neu-
roimaging experiments. A prime example has been the
invocation of the ‘‘pain matrix’’, a distributed set of brain
regions that exhibit a reliable and graded increase in
activation in response to increasing levels of pain. This
pattern of activation is evident across a large number of
functional neuroimaging studies and includes regions of
the periaqueductal gray, thalamus, insula, anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC), and somatosensory cortices (Davis
2000; Duerden and Albanese 2013; Johnstone et al. 2012;
Peyron et al. 2000; Tracey and Mantyh 2007; Wager et al.
2013). Pain, however, is not a unitary phenomenon and a
dissociation between neural systems subserving pain affect
and pain sensation has been proposed, with limbic regions
of the matrix encoding the emotional aspects of pain and
primary sensory regions encoding the location and inten-
sity of pain sensation (Price 2000; Rainville et al. 1997).
Interestingly, limbic regions typically activated during
pain, especially the anterior insula and dorsal ACC, are
not only active during moments of physical pain, but also
during moments of social pain, such as when being
ostracized from a social gathering (Eisenberger et al.
2003), vicariously experiencing the pain of another
(Singer et al. 2004), feeling the heartbreak of a recent
break-up (Kross et al. 2011) or the grief following the
death of a loved one (O’Connor et al. 2008). The distinct
overlap of neural activation patterns associated with social
and physical pain has led some to conclude that the shared
representations within the insula and ACC represent the
critical substrate underlying the emotional experience of
pain, thus providing a plausible neural explanation for a
diverse set of complex social constructs ranging from why
rejection hurts to how humans are capable of experiencing
empathy and behaving in an altruistic manner (Eisenber-
ger and Lieberman 2004; Eisenberger 2012; Hein et al.
2010). In essence, activity within a network of regions
referred to here as the ‘‘affective pain matrix’’—which
features the insula and ACC, but may also include other
limbic structures such as the amygdala (Neugebauer et al.
2004; Simons et al. 2014; Veinante et al. 2013)—has
become commensurate with the emotional experience of
pain.
Functional neuroimaging is fundamentally a correlative
technique, and when conducted in isolation, it does not
allow for the extrapolation of causal brain–behavior rela-
tionships. Prior to inferring that activation within limbic
regions of the pain matrix is necessary for the emotional
experience of pain, it is important to first conduct com-
plementary investigations using other techniques that allow
for more causal inferences. The lesion method provides a
more direct test of causality and can be utilized to help
constrain the interpretation of functional neuroimaging
data (Feinstein 2013). In the case of pain, the lesion method
allows an investigator to determine whether or not a par-
ticular brain region is ‘‘necessary’’ for its experience.
Beginning in the early 1950s, reports emerged of a
profound akinetic mutism that was accompanied by a
marked indifference to pain in patients presenting with
large bilateral lesions that impacted the ACC (Nielsen and
Jacobs 1951; Barris and Schuman 1953). Psychosurgeries
commenced shortly thereafter, where patients with chronic
intractable pain from a variety of etiologies received focal
ACC lesions (Hurt and Ballantine 1973) or circumscribed
anterior cingulotomies (Foltz and White 1962) in an effort
to reduce their pain. Post-surgical observations highlighted
a selective reduction in pain-related anxiety and distress,
despite the fact that most patients continued to experience
the sensation of pain (Foltz and White 1962). However, no
quantitative sensory testing was ever conducted and the
primary endpoint variable was a lack of opiate withdrawal
symptoms to pain medication. Unfortunately, most of these
studies were poorly controlled and lacked objective criteria
and a proper control group for assessing the efficacy of the
procedure. In a more recent study, the majority of patients
receiving an anterior cingulotomy reported ‘‘mild’’
improvement in pain 1 year post-surgery, as well as a
reduced tendency to ruminate about pain; nevertheless
most patients continued to experience ‘‘significant levels of
pain’’ at follow-up (Cohen et al. 2001). Quite strikingly, the
only two studies to conduct quantitative sensory testing in a
post-cingulotomy patient both found increases (rather than
decreases) in pain intensity and unpleasantness ratings to
painful thermal stimuli (Davis et al. 1994; Greenspan et al.
2008).
In contrast to the cingulate, very little research has
examined pain in patients with bilateral amygdala damage.
The main exception is the case of patient HM, who showed
markedly diminished perception of heat-induced pain that
may have been confounded by the presence of peripheral
neuropathy (Hebben et al. 1985).
With respect to the insular cortex, a close inspection of
past studies examining pain in patients with damage to this
region reveals a mixed set of findings. Geschwind (1965)
first speculated that lesions to the insula could disconnect
the secondary somatosensory cortex from the limbic sys-
tem causing a condition known as pain asymbolia, where
the patient remains able to feel the sensation of pain
without experiencing the associated emotional response
(e.g., distress or behavioral withdrawal). Consistent with
Geschwind’s hypothesis, six stroke patients with unilateral
lesions to the insula were found to have pain asymbolia
when tested during the acute phase after their stroke
(Berthier et al. 1988). However, the lesions often extended
into adjacent territories (including parietal operculum,
secondary somatosensory cortex, and supramarginal gyrus)
making it unclear as to whether the insula damage was the
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primary cause for the deficit. No studies have replicated the
original finding of pain asymbolia following insula dam-
age. Instead, a recent study found that damage to the
posterior insula has a more deleterious effect on tempera-
ture perception than pain (Baier et al. 2014). And while
several studies have reported increased pain thresholds
following unilateral insula lesions (Greenspan et al. 1999;
Schon et al. 2008), others have reported pain hypersensi-
tivity (Starr et al. 2009), and in some cases focal damage to
the posterior insula and parietal operculum can actually
induce pain (Bowsher 2006; Thomas-Anterion et al. 2010;
Veldhuijzen et al. 2010) and trigger a debilitating central
neuropathic pain syndrome termed operculo-insular pain
(Garcia-Larrea et al. 2010). The condition can be so ago-
nizing that in one of the originally reported case studies the
patient committed suicide in order to stop the pain (Bie-
mond 1956). An important limitation of all the previous
studies is that they were conducted in patients with uni-
lateral insula lesions.
Based on the available lesion evidence, there have been
no definitive studies to date that have addressed the nec-
essary role of the affective pain matrix with regard to the
experience of pain. The previous studies all involved
patients with either unilateral insula lesions or small
bilateral ACC lesions, but never a patient with damage that
encompassed both structures. The ideal test case would
require a lesion patient with extensive bilateral damage that
not only subsumed both the insula and ACC, but also other
key limbic structures implicated in pain such as the
amygdala (Neugebauer et al. 2004; Simons et al. 2014;
Veinante et al. 2013). Here we present such a case, an
extraordinarily rare neurological patient known as Roger,
whose brain damage encompasses all of the core limbic
structures commonly associated with pain, bilaterally,
including the insula and ACC, as well as the amygdala
(Figs. 1, 2). We reasoned that if these structures are indeed
necessary for the emotional experience of pain, then
Roger’s damage should reduce or abolish such experience.
Methods
The Institutional Review Board at the University of Iowa
approved all study procedures and written informed con-
sent was obtained from the patient and his family prior to
conducting this study.
Participant
Roger is a 55-year-old fully right-handed male with
16 years of education. At the age of 28, he survived a life-
threatening episode of herpes simplex encephalitis (HSE),
a viral attack that triggers a process of necrosis within the
brain causing the ‘‘total disintegration of the affected tis-
sue’’ (Hierons et al. 1978). In this case, HSE destroyed
most of his limbic system, bilaterally, including his insula,
ACC, and amygdala (Figs. 1, 2). Of note, the term limbic
system has been used to describe Roger’s brain damage
since virtually all of the key structures typically defined as
comprising the limbic system have been bilaterally dam-
aged in Roger (Feinstein et al. 2010). Detailed descriptions
of his medical history and analyses of his lesion and neu-
ropsychological profile have been reported elsewhere
(Feinstein et al. 2010; Philippi et al. 2012). Remarkably,
much of Roger’s cognitive abilities are within the normal
range, including his intellectual functioning, speech, lan-
guage, attention, working memory, and metacognition. His
main presenting deficits include a dense global amnesia,
along with anosmia and ageusia.
Roger’s subjective pain ratings were compared to a
group of 29 healthy non-brain-damaged male subjects
(average age: 29 years; range 18–55) using an identical
cold pressor task and similar procedures from a previously
published dataset (Lee et al. 2010).
Imaging of Roger’s brain
Three T1-weighted magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
scans were acquired on a 3.0-Tesla Siemens Trio
MRI scanner (MPRAGE, AC-PC aligned coronal acqui-
sition; TR = 2,530 ms; TE = 3 ms; TI = 800 ms; flip
angle = 10; FOV = 256 9 256 mm2; slice thickness =
1 mm). The images were bias field corrected and registered
together with a rigid body transformation and a sinc
interpolation (AIR 3.08). The three scans were then aver-
aged together in order to reduce motion artifacts, increase
the signal-to-noise ratio, and enhance the contrast-to-noise
ratio between gray and white matter (see Fig. 1). The
images were then converted into MNI space (see Fig. 2).
Stimuli and procedure
To assess the experience of pain, we utilized the cold
pressor paradigm, a gold standard that has been repeatedly
used over the past century to safely induce transient states
of intense pain (Edes and Dallenbach 1936; Lovallo 1975;
Rainville et al. 1992). Roger underwent four cold pressor
immersions (two left-hand trials and two right-hand trials),
each on a separate day to avoid the effects of pain sum-
mation. During each cold pressor trial, Roger’s hand was
immersed (up to the wrist) in circulating water maintained
at a temperature of 0 C (32 F). Water was circulated
continuously to maintain target water temperature and
avoid localized warming around the hand. The forearm was
supported using a soft armrest and the hand was maintained
at a constant immersion depth. Prior to each cold pressor
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trial, Roger underwent a baseline warm water immersion,
placing the same hand in a different tank of water main-
tained at 33 C (91.4 F). The warm water trials served as a
control condition and normalized limb temperature prior to
each cold pressor test. For all trials, a white curtain was
hung between Roger and the immersion tank, blocking his
ability to see his immersed hand (in either the warm or cold
water). Trials were conducted in a single-blinded fashion
such that Roger was not informed beforehand whether his
hand would be immersed in warm or cold water.
Throughout each immersion, Roger continuously rated
his moment-to-moment level of pain (instructions detailed
Fig. 1 Roger’s brain. a Sagittal MRI slices showing bilateral lesions
to the ACC (leftmost images) and insula (rightmost images). b Coronal
MRI slices showing bilateral lesions to the amygdala (top) and right
secondary somatosensory cortex (bottom). c 3D digital ‘‘dissection’’
of the insular cortex: top lateral view of the brain of a healthy non-
brain damaged participant, revealing the gyrations of the insular
cortex; bottom lateral view of Roger’s brain, highlighting the absence
of an insular cortex; left axial MRI slices corresponding to the dashed
lines on the 3D-images. All MRI slices are shown in radiological
convention. Volumetric analyses (Philippi et al. 2012) reveal that his
lesion encompasses 90 % of the insula, 99 % of the ACC, and 100 %
of the amygdala. The lesion extends beyond these regions into other
limbic territories with more extensive damage in the right hemi-
sphere. The entire right insula is destroyed and the damage in the
posterior sector extends into parietal operculum, secondary
somatosensory cortex, and the underlying white matter. The vast
majority of the left insula is also destroyed with the exception of a
small island of tissue in the left dorsal anterior insula that appears to
be functionally disconnected from the rest of the brain (Philippi et al.
2012). Although the ACC has been destroyed bilaterally, the more
dorsal and posterior aspects of Brodmann area 32 appear to be spared
in the left hemisphere; however, this remaining tissue is dorsal to the
paracingulate sulcus, and is therefore considered part of the paracin-
gulate cortex (and not the ACC proper). Of note, Roger’s lesion has
largely spared the brainstem, thalamus, and primary and secondary
somatosensory cortices. The only exception is the aforementioned
damage to the right secondary somatosensory cortex, as well as some
localized atrophy in the right thalamus and right pons. The reader is
referred to Fig. 2 and Feinstein et al. 2010 and Philippi et al. 2012 for
additional brain scans and a more detailed account of Roger’s damage
Brain Struct Funct
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Fig. 2 Roger’s brain in
comparison to the standard MNI
brain. a Sagittal, b coronal, and
c axial MRI slices through
Roger’s brain placed next to the
same slice from the standard
MNI brain
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below) using a 10-cm electronic visual analog scale
(eVAS) along both sensory and affective dimensions. Pain
ratings (recorded to the nearest millimeter) were trans-
mitted from the digital linear potentiometer to a laptop
computer at a sampling rate of 50 Hz. A stopwatch was
used to calculate the total immersion time. During each
immersion, Roger’s facial and vocal responses were
recorded using a digital video camera and we also recorded
continuous measures of heart rate, skin conductance, and
facial electromyography (EMG) of the corrugator.
Self-ratings
For each hand, there were two different types of trials:
‘‘sensory’’ and ‘‘affective’’. During the sensory trials,
Roger continuously rated the intensity of his pain, ranging
from ‘‘No Pain’’ to ‘‘Worst Pain Imaginable’’. During the
affective trials, Roger continuously rated how ‘‘unpleas-
ant’’ or ‘‘bothersome’’ the pain felt to him, ranging from
‘‘Not at all unpleasant’’ to ‘‘Extremely unpleasant’’. For all
immersions, rating instructions were repeated every 30 s
because of his amnesia. Prior to each immersion, the dif-
ference between pain affect and pain sensation was
described to Roger using a standardized set of instructions
(Price et al. 1983): ‘‘There are two aspects of pain which
we are interested in measuring: the intensity, how strong
the pain feels, and the unpleasantness or how disturbing the
pain is for you. The distinction between these two aspects
of pain is like listening to a radio. As the volume increases,
I can ask you how loud it sounds or how unpleasant or
bothersome it is to hear. The intensity of pain is like
loudness; the unpleasantness of pain is like how disturbing
or bothersome the sound is. Please indicate how intense or
unpleasant/bothersome this task is when we ask you.’’
Facial coding
All facial coding was performed by an expert coder (KM
Prkachin) using the Facial Action Coding System (Ekman
et al. 2002). Previous work (Prkachin 1992; Prkachin and
Solomon 2008) suggests that four facial actions comprise
the bulk of a prototypical facial expression of pain: (1)
brow-lowering; (2) tightening the eyelids or raising the
cheeks (orbit tightening); (3) nose wrinkling or upper-lip
raising (levator contraction); and (4) eye closure. Each of
the first 3 facial actions was coded on a 6-point intensity
scale (from 0 = no action, 1 = minimal action to
5 = maximal action). Eye closure was coded on a binary
scale (0 = eyes open, 1 = eyes closed). A composite score
was computed by summing the 4 facial action scores
together (0 = no trace of a pain face to 16 = maximum
expression of a pain face). Video clips of equal durations
(corresponding to the first 50 s of immersion) were created
for all four cold pressor and four warm water immersions.
The eight video segments were randomized prior to coding
and all facial coding was performed without sound so that
the rater was blinded to the condition being viewed.
Actions were coded on a frame-by-frame basis at a time
resolution of 67 ms per frame.
Psychophysiology
Physiological data (including heart rate, skin conductance,
and corrugator facial EMG) were recorded continuously
during all trials with an MP100 acquisition unit (Biopac
Systems, Inc). Heart rate was collected via lead II config-
uration, at a sampling rate of 250 Hz. EMG responses were
recorded from the corrugator muscle, at a sampling rate of
1,000 Hz. Skin conductance level was recorded using two
electrodes placed on the thenar and hypothenar eminences
on the non-immersed hand, at a sampling rate of 1,000 Hz.
For all physiological measures, change scores were com-
puted moment-to-moment based upon the averaged 10-s
period of time immediately preceding each immersion.
Results
Primary pain evaluation
Pain withdrawal
Prior to each immersion (both warm and cold), Roger was
instructed to keep his hand in the water for as long as pos-
sible. He was further instructed that he could remove his
hand if the pain became intolerable. Unbeknownst to Roger,
the maximum trial length was 5 min for cold pressor
immersions and 3 min for warm water immersions. Roger’s
hand remained in the water for the entirety of all warm water
immersions. Conversely, for all four cold pressor immer-
sions, Roger reached his tolerance threshold and withdrew
his hand from the water before the maximum allocated time
frame (average tolerance time: 87 s; range 37–151 s). In
comparison, a group of 29 healthy male subjects had an
average tolerance time that was over twice as long as Roger
(average: 185 s; SD: 107 s; range 25–300 s). At all with-
drawal time points, Roger reached his tolerance threshold
faster than the comparison subjects. For example, at 37 s
(Roger’s shortest trial), 90 % of subjects still had their hand
in the water, and at 151 s (Roger’s longest trial), 59 % of
subjects still had their hand in the water.
Self-report of pain
During all four cold pressor trials, Roger’s real-time sub-
jective ratings of pain (both sensory and affective) indicated
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that he subjectively experienced extreme levels of pain that
peaked within the first minute of each immersion (Fig. 3).
For 3 of the trials, his subjective ratings reached the max-
imum level (eVAS = 10/10), and for the other trial, he
withdrew his hand shortly before reaching the maximum
(eVAS = 8.7/10). In contrast, his pain ratings remained at
or near the floor throughout the warm water immersions
(Fig. 3a). Throughout each cold pressor trial, Roger’s level
of pain was elevated well beyond the 75th percentile of the
average ratings from the comparison sample (Fig. 3a).
There were no marked differences between his reported
level of pain during right-handed immersions vs. left-han-
ded immersions (Fig. 3b). His ratings of pain unpleasant-
ness showed a tendency to reach their peak faster than his
ratings of pain intensity (Fig. 3b).
Secondary pain evaluation
Pain interview
Roger had no difficulty understanding the instructions of
the cold pressor task, as clearly evident by his divergent
subjective ratings during cold versus warm water trials. In
order to further assess his knowledge about pain, we con-
ducted a separate interview (transcribed below) where
Roger demonstrated an astute conceptual understanding of
the distinction between sensory and affective components
of pain, and how the latter could be regulated based on
situational factors.
Interviewer: Imagine someone lit a match and touched
you with it and then I asked you two questions, how warm
was it versus how painful was it?
Roger: It was too warm… it was burning hot. It hurt.
Interviewer: So how are these two questions different?
Roger: It was warm enough to burn and because it
burned it was painful.
Interviewer: Can something be warm and not painful?
Roger: Yes. The fireplace across the room is a lot dif-
ferent than putting your arm in it.
Interviewer: Can something be painful and not warm?
Roger: Yes. Swallowing an ice cube! (Jokingly) Cool
the esophagus off.
Interviewer: Okay. Let’s say you swallowed an ice cube
and I asked you how painful was it and how much did it
bother you?
Roger: It might be more of that [referring to the latter].
Interviewer: So what’s the difference between these
two questions: how painful and how much did it bother
you?
Roger: Painful would be what you remember right away
and how much did it bother you might be enough to teach
you not to do it again.
Interviewer: So what’s an example of something that
might be painful but doesn’t bother you?
Roger: I have to poke my finger and get a little spot of
blood and do a blood test. I’m diabetic. It’s painful, but I
have to do it.
Interviewer: So because you have to do it, it doesn’t
bother you as much?
Roger: Yep.
Interviewer: What would you say Roger is the difference
between emotional pain and physical pain?
Roger: Emotional pain you can not find a spot (pointing
to the body) and put a bandage on it.
Fig. 3 Self-ratings of pain. Roger’s real-time subjective ratings of
pain using a 10-cm electronic visual analog scale. a Roger’s average
level of pain across all four immersions for both the cold pressor and
warm water trials. The black line represents the median cold pressor
pain ratings in the healthy comparison sample and the shaded gray
region represents the comparisons’ 25th–75th percentile. b Roger’s
individual online ratings for each of the four cold pressor immersions.
The ratings for the pain intensity trials range from ‘‘No Pain’’ (0) to
‘‘Worst Pain Imaginable’’ (10). The ratings for the pain affect trials
range from ‘‘Not at all Unpleasant’’ (0) to ‘‘Extremely Unpleasant’’
(10). The closed circles represent the moment when Roger withdrew
his hand from the water, thus terminating the trial
Brain Struct Funct
123
Facial expression of pain
During the cold pressor immersions, Roger’s face was
coded as having at least some degree of pain 35.7 % of the
time (Fig. 4a), with essentially no differences between the
left and right hand immersions (35.4 vs. 36.1 %). During
the time periods when Roger’s face was coded as
expressing pain, his average pain face composite score
across immersions was 2.52 (SD = 1.54), with the left-
hand immersions evoking more intense facial expressions
than right hand immersions [average composite score for
left hand vs. right hand: 3.29 (SD = 1.35) vs. 1.64
(SD = 1.26)]. All of these average composite scores fall
within the normal range of scores obtained in healthy male
participants undergoing a similar cold pressor procedure
(average composite score of 2.45 (SD = 3.15); scores
computed using data from Prkachin 1992). In contrast to
the cold pressor trials, Roger’s face displayed no signs of
pain during the warm water trials (i.e., pain was coded 0 %
of the time). Roger’s corrugator EMG responses, a well-
studied physiological index of distress and unpleasantness
(Lang et al. 1993), were considerably higher during the
cold pressor immersions versus warm water immersions
(Fig. 4b). As expected, the time points of his peak corru-
gator EMG responses often corresponded to the time points
where his facial expression of pain was coded as most
intense.
Pain vocalization
Roger exhibited intense pain vocalizations throughout each
cold pressor immersion, whereas such vocalizations were
absent during the warm water immersions. These vocal-
izations were exaggerated in terms of frequency, volume
intensity, and prosodic inflection with respect to those
typically exhibited by healthy comparison participants.
Although subjects will occasionally make spontaneous
comments about their painful experience, Roger’s com-
mentary was disinhibited and explosive in nature (Table 1).
Autonomic response
During warm water immersions, Roger’s average heart rate
and skin conductance tended to either remain the same or
slowly decrease over time with respect to baseline (Fig. 5).
In contrast, during cold pressor immersions Roger’s heart
rate (Fig. 5a) gradually increased over the course of the
first minute and remained elevated for the remainder of the
trial, and his skin conductance (Fig. 5b) showed a rapid
increase during the first 10 s, followed by a brief dip, and
then a slow ramping for the remainder of the trial.
Discussion
This study provided the unique opportunity to examine
pain in a rare encephalitis patient with extensive bilateral
damage to core limbic structures commonly associated
with pain, including the insula, ACC, and amygdala.
Against expectations, the patient’s expression and experi-
ence of pain was found to be intact across multiple pain
measures including self-report, facial expression, vocali-
zation, withdrawal reaction, and autonomic response. This
finding was consistent across four separate cold pressor
immersions, testing both the left and right hand, with no
notable differences between hands, and no notable differ-
ences between the patient’s report of pain affect versus
pain sensation. Moreover, the patient’s experience of pain
Fig. 4 Pain facial expressions. a Roger’s average pain face compos-
ite score during cold pressor trials (blue line) and warm water trials
(orange line). b Average corrugator EMG responses (expressed in
standard deviations of the power, with respect to baseline) during cold
pressor trials (blue line) and warm water trials (orange line)
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was discriminative in nature, being present during cold
water immersions and absent during warm water immer-
sions, despite being blinded to the testing condition. The
patient’s preserved experience of pain in the face of
bilateral lesions encompassing the insula, ACC, and
amygdala, demonstrates that these structures are not nec-
essary for consciously experiencing the suffering inherent
to pain.
Table 1 Roger’s pain
vocalizations
Roger’s pain-related
vocalizations transcribed for
each immersion. The spelling
attempts to characterize the
literal enunciation for each of
his vocalizations. Exclamation
marks indicate vocalizations
that were emitted with high
levels of intensity. Time
represents the amount of time
(in minutes and seconds) that
his hand had been immersed in
the water
Day #1—left hand
Warm water (total time = 3:00)
Time 1:06 ? It’s not unpleasant at all
Time 1:40 ? No pain
Cold water (total time = 2:31)
Time 0:00 ? Wa-hoo! Wow! Yes, that is cold! Wow
Time 0:14 ? Wow. Ya. Eww
Time 0:34 ? Wa-ew! Ew-how!
Time 0:44 ? Extremely unpleasant
Time 1:02 ? It feels extremely unpleasant
Time 1:42 ? Oww
Day #2—right hand
Warm water (total time = 3:00)
Time 0:07 ? Comfortable. Comfortable, no pain
Time 0:37 ? No pain
Time 1:00 ? None
Cold water (total time = 1:47)
Time 0:03 ? No ice cubes, but it’s ice water!
Time 0:08 ? Oww
Time 0:14 ? Ew-how
Time 0:27 ? We-ye. Ha
Time 0:31 ? A lot stronger, more intense signals being sent than the hot water. Wow
Time 0:50 ? Wow-ha. Ow! It is pretty bad. Wow. Ya
Time 1:04 ? Ew-ow
Time 1:32 ? It is that bad [pointing to rating scale]. Worst
Day #3—left hand
Warm water (total time = 3:00)
Time 0:12 ? It feels good. Hurts so good (making joke). Warm water
Cold water (total time = 0:54)
Time 0:01 ? Wy-ha! Ew-ha! Woah, ahh, eww
Time 0:14 ? Ay!
Time 0:18 ? Wow. Whew-hew-hew
Time 0:36 ? Oww. Ew, oww, eww!
Time 0:43 ? Ow! Ew
Time 0:48 ? It is bad! Owww! Ow. I want it out!
Day #4—right hand
Warm water (total time = 3:00)
Time 0:48 ? Not the hottest or the coldest.
Cold water (total time = 0:37)
Time 0:01 ? Ay-ya-ya! Woah
Time 0:15 ? Wow. Who. Ow-we-ha!
Time 0:17 ? It feels cold all the way through
Time 0:22 ? Wow! Ow! Wow. Ow. Wow-ew. Wow! Ow!
Time 0:32 ? That is bad! It is bad. Wow! Wow. Oww! Ow
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Theoretical implications
These findings have important theoretical implications for
the notion of a ‘‘pain matrix’’. Previous work has already
raised the question about whether the pain matrix is spe-
cific to nociception, and the evidence shows that activation
within the matrix is not sufficient for the experience of pain
and can be induced by a variety of non-nociceptive stimuli
(Iannetti and Mouraux 2010; Mouraux et al. 2011). Here,
we extend this body of work by showing that key structures
of the pain matrix are also not necessary for the experience
of pain, including pain’s affective dimension (Price 2000;
Rainville et al. 1997). In this context, it is important to note
that Roger’s damage also includes structures posited to
play a more basic role in pain sensation, including the
posterior insula (bilaterally) and the adjacent parietal
operculum and secondary somatosensory cortex (in the
right hemisphere). Based on this additional damage and the
noted presence of pain following stimulation of both sides
of the body, it can be further deduced that these lesioned
sensory structures are also not necessary for the experience
of pain, calling into question recent claims that the dorsal
posterior insula is the brain’s ‘‘primary cortex for pain’’
(Garcia-Larrea 2012). Thus, the core limbic structures of
the pain matrix, including insula and ACC, are neither
necessary nor sufficient for the experience of pain.
Such a conclusion refutes the reverse inferences being
made in functional neuroimaging investigations of social
pain. For example, activation of the ACC during studies of
social rejection may not be the causal factor explaining
why ‘‘rejection hurts’’ (Eisenberger et al. 2003; Eisenber-
ger and Lieberman 2004; Eisenberger 2012). Likewise,
activation of the anterior insula during studies of empathy
may not represent the vicarious experience of another’s
pain (Singer et al. 2004). The results in Roger raise the
possibility that the overlapping activation found in the
insula and ACC during states of physical and social pain
does not necessarily reflect the experience of pain itself.
Indeed, patients with congenital insensitivity to pain
showed normal levels of insula and ACC activity when
observing pain in others, even though they themselves are
unable to feel pain (Danziger et al. 2009). On the other
hand, psychopaths showed abnormally high levels of insula
activity when observing pain in others, leading the authors
of this study to conclude, ‘‘the role of the insula in emotion
and empathy is complex and far from being understood’’
(Decety et al. 2013). Collectively, these data challenge the
core assumptions underlying the neural connection
between physical and social pain (cf. Iannetti et al. 2013),
while underscoring the importance of resisting causal
attributions based purely on functional neuroimaging data
(Feinstein 2013).
Beyond pain, the insula and ACC are the two most
commonly activated structures in any functional neuroim-
aging investigation of emotion and feeling (Craig 2009;
Phan et al. 2002). While it would be tempting to conclude
that the insula and ACC are the brain’s primary substrate
for emotional experience, the case of Roger reveals that
neither region is actually necessary for such experience to
occur. This is an important point since several investigators
have recently claimed that the anterior insula is the nec-
essary substrate underlying all forms of emotional aware-
ness (Craig 2009; Gu et al. 2013). We have previously
shown that Roger’s self-awareness is remarkably preserved
across a large battery of tests (Philippi et al. 2012),
including a measure of interoceptive awareness (Khalsa
et al. 2009). In this study, we demonstrate that many
aspects of Roger’s emotional awareness are also preserved,
Fig. 5 Heart rate and skin conductance changes. Roger’s average
autonomic response during cold pressor trials (blue line) and warm
water trials (orange line). a Mean change from baseline in heart rate
(beats per minute). b Mean skin conductance level (standard
deviations from baseline). The gray dotted lines correspond to
±1SD across trials. The dip in average skin conductance around 37 s
corresponds to the end of one of the trials when Roger withdrew his
hand
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a finding which casts grave doubt on the assertion that the
insula is the brain’s most important substrate for feeling
(Craig 2015; Damasio 2003).
Hyperpathic pain
Quite unexpectedly, not only did Roger feel pain, but his
pain experience was at times excessive in nature and
potentially hyperpathic. The International Association for
the Study of Pain characterizes hyperpathic pain as ‘‘an
abnormally painful reaction to a stimulus’’ that ‘‘is often
explosive in character’’ (cf. http://www.iasp-pain.org).
Consistent with this definition, Roger’s subjective rating of
pain during cold pressor trials was often at the maximum
level, well above the 75th percentile of the corresponding
ratings from the comparison group (Fig. 3a). Likewise, he
reached his pain tolerance threshold and withdrew his hand
much earlier than the majority of subjects in the compar-
ison group. Perhaps the clearest evidence of hyperpathic
pain was in his vocalizations, which were explosive and
disinhibited (Table 1). These indications of hyperpathic
pain in Roger will need to be further investigated using
more precise thermal and mechanical pain-induction
techniques, and compared to an age- and race-matched
sample. Despite these limitations, Roger’s data suggest that
the limbic structures commonly associated with pain may
play a fundamental role in pain regulation. Under this view,
the missing regions in Roger’s brain would impair his
ability to control and downregulate his pain responses. This
would be in line with a large body of literature on the role
of the ACC in adaptive control, not only for pain, but also
cognition and autonomic arousal (Shackman et al. 2011;
Botvinick et al. 2004; Critchley et al. 2003). Such an
interpretation is also consistent with the significant distur-
bances found in circuitry involving the insula, ACC, and
amygdala in patients and animals under conditions of
chronic pain (Borsook and Becerra 2006; Bushnell et al.
2013; Veinante et al. 2013). However, Roger is not a
chronic pain patient and it is unclear how his brain damage
might reflect alterations in the chronic pain state. Together,
these findings suggest that the functional role of the limbic
structures comprising the pain matrix may be more aligned
with the adaptive regulation and response to pain rather
than providing the decisive substrate for pain’s conscious
experience, affective or otherwise.
How does Roger feel pain?
The question remains as to which brain regions might be
supporting Roger’s preserved experience of pain. We
attempted to investigate this question with Roger using
fMRI. Over the course of many different runs (collected
over multiple days), Roger was unable to refrain from pain-
related movements, an unfortunate byproduct of his afore-
mentioned hyperpathic responses. In spite of all our efforts
at correcting his movement artifacts, the pain fMRI data
were not exploitable. We hope that methodological solu-
tions will be found for rendering future pain-related fMRI
studies with Roger possible. Until then, we can only spec-
ulate as to which brain regions might be supporting his pain
experience. From a neuroanatomical perspective, nearly all
pain signals traverse through nuclei within the brainstem
and thalamus, both of which are largely intact in Roger and
could be playing a critical role in his pain experience. While
Roger’s ACC is destroyed bilaterally, there is some
remaining tissue in the left hemisphere that corresponds to a
dorsal region of Brodmann area 32 within the paracingulate
gyrus. This region partially overlaps with a recent func-
tional neuroimaging meta-analysis of pain-related activa-
tions (cf. Box 1 and Fig. 2 in Shackman et al. 2011)
suggesting that adjacent territories lying dorsal to the
anterior midcingulate cortex (including the paracingulate
gyrus and supplementary motor area) may be just as
important for pain as the ACC itself. Such an interpretation
is consistent with the observation that most patients with
akinetic mutism—a state that is often accompanied by a
complete indifference to pain—have large bilateral lesions
that typically impact both the ACC and the supplementary
motor area (Damasio and Van Hoesen 1983). Roger’s sec-
ondary somatosensory cortex in the left hemisphere is also
intact and might provide a viable compensatory route for
the damage to this region in his right hemisphere. Of note,
activation in the secondary somatosensory cortices appears
to have one of the strongest relationships with the ‘‘sub-
jective reality of pain’’ (Raij et al. 2005). Another possi-
bility to consider is the primary somatosensory cortices,
which are intact in both hemispheres, and have previously
been shown to play a vital role in Roger’s preserved inter-
oceptive awareness for cardiovascular sensations (Khalsa
et al. 2009). Interestingly, a recent fMRI study tested two
lesion patients with unilateral left insula damage and found
‘‘dramatically elevated’’ levels of activation in the primary
somatosensory cortex related to the patients’ higher pain
ratings during noxious heat stimulation (Starr et al. 2009).
Another noteworthy point of the Starr et al. (2009) study
was the surprising absence of activation in both patients’
right insular cortex during painful stimulation of the right
leg. This provides further evidence that the insula is not
essential for the experience of pain. Nevertheless, it is worth
considering the possibility that the small island of tissue
remaining in Roger’s left dorsal anterior insula (accounting
for less than 10 % of total insular volume) could be con-
tributing to his pain experience. Several points argue
against this possibility: (1) Patient 2 in the Starr et al.
(2009) study had damage that completely subsumed the left
anterior insula, yet he continued to experience pain; (2)
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there are anecdotal reports of pain being experienced by
another encephalitic patient with 100 % complete bilateral
insula destruction (Damasio et al. 2013); and (3) in a pre-
vious study, we found that the tissue in Roger’s left anterior
insula was both structurally and functionally disconnected
from the rest of his brain (Philippi et al. 2012). Based on this
evidence, it is highly unlikely that this small island of tissue
would be playing a prominent role in Roger’s preserved
pain experience.
The case of Roger establishes that the emotional expe-
rience of pain can be instantiated by brain structures outside
of those traditionally presumed to be critical for pain affect,
thus highlighting the widely distributed nature of pain
processing in the brain (Coghill et al. 1999). Due to the
chronicity of Roger’s damage, substantial recovery of
function is plausible via reorganization and transfer to other
brain systems (Rudrauf 2014). It is important to emphasize
that in such a scenario, the very possibility of recovery
would imply that the damaged regions are not necessary for
such experience to occur (in contrast, for instance, to early
visual cortices which are necessary for visual awareness).
This brings forth an educated guess about Roger’s case,
namely that his intact affective experience of pain is due to
plasticity, which helped preserve a vital function for sur-
vival by maintaining his affective response to pain despite
damage to regions that might normally serve this function.
In other words, the adaptive role of pain affect is so essential
that the brain may automatically rewire in service of self-
preservation. Consequently, the neural circuitry underlying
pain and the associated feelings of suffering and distress is
more complicated than previously thought, with multiple
pathways and built-in redundancy allowing for maximal
adaptation and resilience in the face of brain injury.
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